MIND & WORLD H. 2 THE UNBOUDEDNESS OF THE CONCEPTUAL N.B. DAVID WIGGINS (TUTOR MCDOWELL) SENSE = CONSTRUCTION BEDEUTUNG = DISCOVERY

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1 MIND & WORLD H. 2 THE UNBOUDEDNESS OF THE CONCEPTUAL N.B. DAVID WIGGINS (TUTOR MCDOWELL) SENSE = CONSTRUCTION BEDEUTUNG = DISCOVERY

2 MIND & WORLD 2.1. Experiences are receptivity in operation; so they can satisfy the need for an external control on our freedom in empirical thinking. p.24, r.11 e.v.

3 MIND & WORLD 2.1. Conceptual capacities that belong to spontaneity are already at work in experiences themselves; so experiences can intelligibly stand in rational relations to our exercises of freedom that is implicit in the idea of spontaneity. p.24, r.13 e.v.

4 MIND & WORLD 2.2 We need rational contstraints on our thinking and judging about the empirical world. Davidson proposes that we make do with nothing but causal constraints.

5 MIND & WORLD 2.2 Davidson denies the need for rational constraints, because he rejects the Myth of the Given. But: experiences are receptivity in operation, and therefore equipped with conceptual content. P. 25, r. 28

6 MIND & WORLD 2.2 The joint involvement of receptivity and spontaneity allows us to say that in experience one can take in how things are. p. 25, r. 24

7 MIND & WORLD 2.2 When we acknowledge the possibility of being misled, we do not deprive ourselves of taking in how things are as a description of what happens when one is not misled. p. 26, r. 5 e.v.

8 MIND & WORLD 2.2 being misled Waar gaat dit over?

9 MIND & WORLD 2.2 being misled Argument from illusion (A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, 1940) Voor bestaan sense data in de waarneming.

10 MIND & WORLD 2.2 being misled Argument from illusion Vooronderstelt highest common factor tussen waarneming en illusie.

11 MIND & WORLD 2.2 McDowell wijst die highest common factor tussen waarneming en illusie af. Disjunctieve theorie van de waarneming.

12 MIND & WORLD 2.2 Disjunctieve theorie van de waarneming. Een ervaring is òf een waarneming òf een illusie. Disjunctie Waarneming V Illusie

13 MIND & WORLD 2.2 In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face value.

14 MIND & WORLD 2.2 So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality.

15 MIND & WORLD 2.2 Experience enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks. p. 26, r

16 MIND & WORLD 2.2 That things are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact. p. 26, r

17 MIND & WORLD 2.2 IDEALISME?

18 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Wittgenstein: PI, ± 95 When we say, and mean, that such and such is the case, we and our meaning do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this isso.

19 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Thought must be something unique. When we say, and mean, that such and such is the case, we and our meaning do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this isso. But this paradox (which has the form of a truism) can also be expressed in this way: Thought can be of what is not the case.

20 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Het is mogelijk om te denken wat niet het geval is. Thema uit de Tractatus.

21 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Thema uit de Tractatus. Hoe kunnen negatieve uitspraken waar zijn? Zijn dat ook modellen van de werkelijkheid? Bestaan er negatieve feiten?

22 NEGATIEVE FEITEN RUSSELL, MIND 60, Quite at first I was in doubt as to whether he was a man of genius or a crank, but I very soon decided in favour of the former alternative. Some of his early views made the decision difficult. He maintained, for example, at one time that all existential propositions are

23 NEGATIEV FEITEN meaningless. This was in a lecture room, and I invited him to consider the proposition: There is no hippopotamus in this room at present. When he refused to believe this, I looked under all the desks without finding one, but he remained unconvinced. (B. McGuinness, p. 89)

24 MIND & WORLD 2.3 TLP: proposities zijn bipolair. Er zijn twee manieren van harmonie tussen taal en werkelijkheid. 1. Fit : de realiteit

25 MIND & WORLD Fit : de realiteit past of past niet op een beschrijving. 2. Direction of fit : taal past zich aan de werkelijkheid aan (word world), zoals bij beschrijvingen. Of world word, zoals bij wensen, bevelen.

26 DIRECTION OF FIT Miss Anscombe, Intention, p. 56.: 32. Let us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is clear that the relation of this list to the things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the list or it is his own list;

27 DIRECTION OF FIT and that there is a different relation where a list is made by a detective following him about. If he made the list itself, it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave it him, it has the role of an order.

28 DIRECTION OF FIT What then is the identical relation to what happens, in the order and the intention, which is not shared by the record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man's performance

29 DIRECTION OF FIT (if his wife were to say: Look, it says butter and you have bought margarine, he would hardly reply: What a mistake! we must put that right and alter the word on the list to margarine ); whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record.

30 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Tussen een bevel en het opvolgen van een bevel bestaat een interne relatie, en dus ook met het niet opvolgen van een bevel. Een bevel bevat zijn eigen vervullingscriteria. Daar zit geen intermediair tussen.

31 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Tussen een beschrijving en het waar zijn van een beschrijving bestaat een interne relatie, en dus ook met het niet waar zijn van een beschrijving. Een beschrijving bevat zijn eigen vervullingscriteria (waarheidsvoorwaarden). Daar zit geen intermediair tussen.

32 MIND & WORLD 2.3 there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. So since the world is everything that is the case, there is no gap between thought, as such, and the world. p. 27, r

33 MIND & WORLD 2.3 phobia of idealism p. 28, r.1. In de relatie tussen werkelijkheid (the sort of thing that can be the case) en denken (the sort of thing one can think)geen prioriteit.

34 MIND & WORLD 2.3 THOUGHT vertoont ACT/CONTENT AMBIGUITEIT. ACT = act van denken CONTENT = inhoud van act

35 MIND & WORLD 2.3 CONSTRAINTS ON THOUGHT betekent: Constraints op acten van denken Niet: constraints op inhoud van denkacten (thinkable contents).

36 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Feiten zijn geen denkacten, (geen occurrents) maar inhouden van die acten. De stelling van Pythagoras is geen denkact, maar de inhoud van een denkact.

37 MIND & WORLD 2.3 Term occurrents komt van Ryle. Beliefs 1. Occurrent 2. Dispostion

38 MIND & WORLD 2.3 The constraint comes from outside thinking, but not from outside what is thinkable. p. 28, r. 31/2. What we see is: that such and such is the case. (is a fact)

39 MIND & WORLD 2.4 we could not recognize capacities operative in experience as conceptual at all were it not for the way they are integrated into a rationally organized network of capacities for active adjustment of one s thinking to the deliverances of experience. That is what a repertoire of empirical concepts is. p. 29, r. 23/5.

40 MIND & WORLD 2.4 What it is for something to be red, is not intelligible unless packaged with an understanding of what it is for something to look red. p. 29, r. 32/5. N.b. Zelfde voorbeeld als Sellars gebruikt in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.

41 MIND & WORLD 2.4 No subject could be recognized as having experiences of colour except against a background understanding that makes it possible for judgements endorsing such experiences into her view of the world. She must be equipped with such things as the concept of visible surfaces of objects, and the concept of suitable conditions for telling what something s colour is by looking at it. p. 30, r

42 MIND & WORLD 2.4 Wederzijdse afhankelijkheid van rood zijn en rood eruit zien. Dit is rood, omdat ik het als rood zie. Ik zie dit als rood, omdat het rood is.

43 MIND & WORLD 2.4 N.b. We kunnen het begrip rood toepassen op innerlijke ervaring, omdat we het eerst hebben leren gebruiken om de kleur van objecten te beschrijven.

44 MIND & WORLD 2.4 Contra sense datum theoretici: we hebben geen autonome innerlijke rood ervaring, die we projecteren op objecten in de buitenwereld.

45 MIND & WORLD 2.4 Invloed Strawson: Afzonderlijke ervaringen krijgen hun plaats in een wereldbeeld. We leren beseffen dat dingen die we waarnemen, blijven bestaan, ook als we ze niet waarnemen. Esse non est percipi. p. 32

46 MIND & WORLD 2.4 the subject of the experience understands what the experience takes in as part of a wider reality, a reality that is alle embraceable in thought but not all available to this experience. p. 32, r.13 16

47 MIND & WORLD 2.4 The object of experience is understood as integrated into a wider reality, in a way that mirrors how the relevant concepts are integrated into the repertoire of spontaneity at large. [ ] this integration allows us to understand an experience as awareness of something independent of the experience itself: p. 32, r

48 MIND & WORLD 2.4 Lezen pp r. 25 r. 8

49 MIND & WORLD 2.5 No outer boundary the rational influence on our thinking requires us to delete the outer boundary from the picture. The impressions on our senses that keep the dynamic system in motion are already equipped with conceptual content. p. 34, r

50 MIND & WORLD 2.5 No outer boundary We find ourselves alreay engaging with the world in conceptual activity within such a dynamic system. Any understanding of this condition that it makes to hope for must be from within the system.

51 MIND & WORLD 2.5 No outer boundary It cannot be a matter of picturing the system s adjustments to the world from sideways on: that is, with the system circumscribed within a boundary, and the world outside it. That is exactly the shape our picture must not take. p. 34, r

52 MIND & WORLD 2.5 No outer boundary Vergelijk Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Der Zirkel des Verstehens besteht darin, dass "alle Auslegung, die Verständnis beistellen soll, schon das Auszulegende verstanden haben [muss]" (p. 4, 152)

53 MIND & WORLD 2.5 Lezen p. 34 r. 38 p. 35 r r. 24 p. 36 r. 3

54 MIND & WORLD 2.6 What is inner experience? Geen innerlijke ervaring. feigning anaesthesia. (radicaal behaviorisme)

55 MIND & WORLD 2.6 What is inner experience? Object van ervaring kan bestaan zonder onze (bewuste) ervaring ervan. Deze positie wordt verdedigd door Michael Martin in The Limits of Self Awareness.

56 MIND & WORLD 2.6 What is inner experience? Zelf toeschrijvingen van innerlijke ervaring zijn geen oordelen (Hackers interpretatie van Wittgenstein, 3e deel commentaar op de PI, Meaning and Mind, p. 56.)

57 MIND & WORLD 2.6 What is inner experience? Ik heb pijn. vooronderstelt Iemand is in pijn. (Gareth Evans VoR, h. 7, P.F. Strawson, Bounds of Sense, II.7) Ik is een object te midden van andere objecten.

58 MIND & WORLD 2.6 Lezen p. 37 onderste alinea + eerste alinea p. 38.

59 MIND & WORLD 2.6 Afhankelijk van ervaring voor bestaan Objects inner exp. Sec. qual. outer exp. + Identificeerbaar op andere manier dan in ervaring +

60 MIND & WORLD 2.7 Conceptuele capaciteiten werken niet in op non conceptuele inhoud (impressions). Lezen: p. 39 r. 1 4 Conceptuele inhoud gaat over de wereld.

61 MIND & WORLD 2.7 POINTING AS WAY OUT OF CONCEPTUAL TO SOMETHING THAT IS ALREADY CONCEPTUALIZED

62 MIND & WORLD 2.8 THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE, H. 6, p My disagreement with Strawson is with the way he interprets the idea that we are embedded in a world larger than we can conceive. What lies beyond our current understanding is not adequately captured in the idea of answers we do not yet know how to ask. It may include things we or creatures like us could never formulate questions about.

63 MIND & WORLD 2.8 No end of inquiry Verwijzing naar C. S. Peirce: Truth is the ideal end of inquiry. Amerikaans pragmatisme.

64 MIND & WORLD 2.9 SAMENWERKING RECEPTIVITEIT EN SPONTANITEIT TE ONDERSCHEIDEN? JA, VANUIT EEN TRANSCENDENTAAL STANDPUNT. HET CONCEPTUELE IS OMGEVEN DOOR EEN SUPERSENSIBLE REALITY NEE, VANUIT FENOMENAAL STANDPUNT. DE WERKELIJKHEID IS CONCEPTUALISEERBAAR (STRAWSON)

65 MIND & WORLD 2.8 LEZEN p. 42 r

66 MIND & WORLD 2.8 Barry Stroud, The allure of idealism, in Understanding Human Knowledge, p. 90. If idealism is correct and our ways of thinking constitute the way things are, there will be no difference between examining our ways of thinking and examining the way things are.

67 MIND & WORLD 2.8 Nota bene verwijzing naar Hegel, p. 44!