Financiering van Containerreuzen 17 Pieter Baan
Vraag / aanbod Orderboeken gedomineerd door Containerreuzen Gemeten in TEU is huidige orderboek 30% van de totale container vloot (Alphaliner) Gemiddelde capaciteit orderboek is 6800 TEU / containerschip, vergeleken met 3080 TEU in huidige vloot Current fleet Orderbook Capacity (TEU) Vessels Capacity (TEU) % order Maersk 2,455,014 645 521,033 21.2% MSC 2,029,482 473 476,796 23.5% CMA CGM 1,322,634 394 146,250 11.1% COSCO 650,840 148 244,168 37.5% Hapag Lloyd 627,725 144 131,000 20.9% Evergreen 611,678 167 308,000 50.4% APL 591,015 147 300,880 50.9% CSCL 505,913 143 93,896 18.6% Hanjin 494,654 104 248,963 50.3% CSAV 468,562 112 84,000 17.9% MOL 421,303 100 120,830 28.7% OOCL 412,182 87 131,928 32.0% Hamburg Sud 405,897 118 211,488 52.1% NYK 397,473 101 63,476 16.0% K Line 342,763 80 45,200 13.2% Other 3,422,865 1,959 1,422,092 41.5% Total 15,160,000 4,922 4,550,000 30.1% Source: AXS Alphaliner
Vraag / aanbod Verwacht herstel afgeremd door orders Containerreuzen Levering gedomineerd door container reuzen > 10,000 TEU Sources: AXS Alphaliner, Clarkson Research Studies
Vraag / aanbod Charter rates en waarde van schepen terug op 2003 niveau Groei wereldwijde container markt geschat op 8.3% voor dit jaar, tot 152m TEU (Clarksons) Containter markt ziet overcapaciteit van 1.95m TEU, 13% van huidige vloot (Alphaliner) Gevolg van overcapaciteit: freight rates terug tot onder 2003-niveau USD/day 50.000 40.000 Mainlane East- West 30.000 Other East- West North-South Intra-regional 20.000 10.000 0 2003-01 2005-01 2007-01 2009-01 2011-01 Panamax 3500TEU Panamax 4400TEU Sub-Panamax 2750TEU Source: Clarkson Research Studies
Vraag / aanbod Mitigerende factoren op overcapaciteit Scrapping: voor 2011 geschat op slechts 46,500 TEU. Voor 2012 geschat op 38,600 TEU (Clarksons) Idling: Momenteel ligt 120,000 TEU (0.8%) idle, vergeleken met 1.5m TEU (12%) in Dec 2009 (Clarksons) Cascading down effect: in hoeverre wordt capaciteit vanuit Azie-Europa trade ingezet op andere trades? Sources: AXS Alphaliner, Clarkson Research Studies
Shipping s eigen credit crunch Wie gaat de containerreuzen financieren? Een USD460mrd orderboek Negatieve outlook shipping banken 1% 3% 18% 18% 19% Tankers 0% 41% Bulkers Combination carriers Containerships LNG Carriers LPG Carriers Other (Offshore, Cruise, MMP, FPSO, Ro-Ro) US$m 100.000 90.000 80.000 70.000 60.000 50.000 40.000 30.000 20.000 10.000 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 3Q2011 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Sources: Clarksons, Marsoft Syndicated shipping debt (LHS) Source: Clarksons Number of deals (RHS)
Shipping s eigen credit crunch (II) Wie gaat de containerreuzen financieren? Oorzaak Financiële crisis Effect Bank USD en EUR funding kosten zijn dramatisch gestegen Spread in bps 700 600 500 400 CDS spreads (5yr) Overcapaciteit in container liner markt Risk migratie Druk op charter rates en waarde van schepen Vlucht naar top tier klanten met stabiele cashflows en lagere LTV s 300 200 100 - Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Example Scandinavian Banks Example French Banks Example UK Banks Example German banks Example PIGS Banks Source: Bloomberg Banken zien intern gevecht om kapitaal Andere sectoren (e.g. offshore) hebben betere risk/reward Exits en balans reducties Gevestigde shipping banken hebben shipping vaarwel gezegd USD 40bln Ship loan portfolio te koop
Verzekering van container reuzen Een voorbeeld Gemiddelde waarde USD 30,000 per container, met 15,000 containers een totale waarde USD 450mln. Totale waarde schip USD 600mln met lading en bunker kosten Totale aansprakelijkheid: verzekerde limieten tot USD 5mrd per schip Sources: Lloyds, Post & Co
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