Personal Information & User Control

Transcriptie

1 Personal Information & User Control Challenges & Opportunities for egovernment Luk Vervenne Synergetics nv

2 Agenda User centric, user driven, user control,... Some trends & early adoptor projects MyPDS Trust & Security for sharing P(I)I Back to basics: some suggestions for regions and municipalities (Kortrijk- Mypage??)

3 From LMS to PLE Multiple Authoritive relations Non-authoritive relations (free, social networks,...) a b c Educational Institute Employer Service providers end-user PLE user user user Personal Learning Environment

4 Portfolio based Lifelong Employability Services School SP1 offering SchoolPortfolio 1 IdP1 3 employability SP2 offering JOB MyPDS 5 employability SP3 offering UWV services 7 IdP2 6 employability SP4 offering EVC

5 Personal Data Store The Business Processes of the lifelong sequence of Service Providers generate MORE data than they initially require for kickstarting their service. All REUSABLE resulting personal information goes back into the users PDS. This accumulation of Personal Inforrmation allows the automated data provisioning of the next-in-line service providers business process. Born Graduate School eportfolio First JOB EVC SP Retrained/ unemployed Second JOB MyPDS (Personal Data Store) (employabilityportfolio)

6 MyPDS (Personal Data Store) eurocv LinkedIn Patient Summary UK Leap2a Europass HR-XML (GermanCV, iprofile UK) IMS (profile) Portfolio 1 Import Export Create, Read, Update, Delete XSLT Mapping GUI Service Requesters egov, HR or ehealth System 1 CRUD WS 3 CRUD WS 2 SOA Gateway WS Web Services MyPDS Exchange Server (ep, PHR)

7 Regional/Sectorial Employability Platform Content provider 1 Content provider 2 Content provider 3 econtent Gateway Collective Intelligence Engine Personal Learning Environment Personal Infrastructure Content provider 4 Competence Analyzer Service MyPDS Employability Portfolio Employability (Business) Processes Trust Architecture

8 Let s get Personal A personal data store is not the same as a personal computer at home with all your sensitive data on its hard disk The crucial difference in thinking personal : Personal does not mean that you own, manage, or safeguard your own data just as you would guard your credit card. A PDS is not the same as a personal computer. 8-May-09 8

9 Let s get Personal and it also is not just a remote storage facility that manages all your sensitive data for you. A personal data store also is not a remote hosted profile that happens to be about you. 8-May-09 9

10 Securely Sharing Services from a trustworthy Personal Data Store 10

11 Let s get Personal TAS 3 is about trusting others with your sensitive data. TAS 3 allows you to rely on professional data centers / managers to keep your data safe(against loss or corruption), while YOU control every aspect to keep your data secure(against theft or abuse). 8-May-09 11

12 A personal data storage is a possibly distributed collection of data about you, to which YOU hold the access control key. YOUdetermine who may see what, when, and for which purpose. And YOUcan always find out who, when, and for which purpose looked at your data. YOUhave the legal right to sue them if you discover abuse of trust or agreements, and TAS³will give you the evidence you need. 8-May-09 Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services 12

13 Let s get Personal User-centricity in TAS 3 means that the user holds the keysto the data, but that does not mean the user ownsthe data or is the authoritative source. However you don t control what others say about you, such as in your medical files, or your diplomas. That data is theirs and is signed by them. YOUcontrol who may see it. 8-May-09 13

14 Let s get Personal Without the user turning the key, the data center cannot even read the data. (god forbid!) therefore would not want just your data they would want your keysas well! 8-May-09 14

15 Let s get Personal TAS3 allows for full data protection so that even your MyPDS hosting facility just keeps unreadable blobs. In realistic situations, a hospital system will likely not encrypt everything, but if you oursource storage, you may want to do so. If you exchange, you certainly will encrypt. DigSignatures are needed to prove authenticity 8-May-09 Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services 15

16 TAS³ end2end TRUST ASSURANCE for services based on personal information END2END TAS³ TRUST ASSURANCE LEGAL Contract LEGAL Contract TECHNICAL TAS³ ASSURANCE TAS³ Network Non-TAS³ system TAS³ enabling TAS³ enabling Non-TAS³ system

17 TAS³Trust Model Trust Network Infrastructure Services Trust Network Trust Gurantor (generic) Third Trusted Party (domain specific) Third Trusted Party

18 Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services Trusted Architecture for Securely Sharing Services based on Personal Information using an integrated workflow of authentication and of authorisation, trust & data protection policies luk vervenne Web: IST FP7 funded Integrated Project TAS³ contract number Duration: 1 Jan Dec 2011 Research budget: EC Funding:

19 TAS 3 Project Motivation TAS 3 consolidatesscattered research in integrated4-layer approach of : (1) Authentication (2) Authorization (3) Privacy (4) Trust (Negotiation) TAS 3 integratesadaptive business-driven end2end Trust Services based on personal information while using a semantic integration of Security, Trust, Privacy components TAS 3 providesdynamic view on application-level end2end exchange of personal data in lifelong employability & ehealth domains 8-May-09 Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services 19

20 Authentication & Level of Assurance (LoA) Federated identity management model LoA 4+ E.g., Shibboleth, Liberty Alliance, CardSpace (qualified plus biometric) LoA 4 (qualified cert with smart card EAL4+) LoA 3 (2-factor authentication, non-qualified cert, EAL4 smart card) LoA 2 (one time password) LoA 1 (uid/password, Verisign Class 1 cert) LoA 0 Setting access policies Sensitive medical records (e.g. HIV), Consultant notes containing opinions. Ability to Break the Glass. Bank to bank transfers Patient confidential records (non-sensitive) Some Internet banking applications System administration Retrieve degree certificate. Completing public service employment application Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared 8-May Services (no authentication) Public data

21 Layer 2 Authorization Joe Policy Enforcement Point Service Provider 1 Execute Service Y 6 OK Execute Service Y Check Policy Compliance 2 5 Permit / Deny Service Request Authorization Domain 3 Retrieve Relevant Policies 4 Retrieve Policy Validation Information Policy Access Point Policy Decision Point Policy Information Point Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared 8-May Services

22 Layer 3 - Trustworthiness Joe 1 Joe s Trust Guard Service Providers Which SPs would I Trust? 6 A & D A B C D Analyze Trustworthiness of SPs A-D 2 5 Trustworthiness of SPs A-D Trust Policies Broker Trust Policies Helpers Fetch Joe s Trust Policies Read Trust Newspaper 3 Trust Decision Helper 4 Trust Information Collector Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared 8-May Services Trust Domain

23 Layer 4 Compliance with Data Protection Regulation Joe Data Protection Policy Guard Services Engine 1 Execute Action Z 6 OK Execute Action Z Authentic Data Repository Check Policy Compliance 2 5 Permit / Deny Action Data Protection Domain 3 Retrieve Relevant Policies 4 Retrieve Policy Validation Information Policy Access Point Policy Decision Point Policy Information Point Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared 8-May Services

24 TAS³ Entry Point TAS³ Exit Point TAS³workflow Service Requester PEP Trust & Privacy Negotiator Obligations Watchdog AIPEP Service Requester Audit Guard TAS³ Registry Service Providers Service Types IdPs Authentication Authorities (IdPs) Dash Board Agent Message Preparer PDP Response Verifier Authorization, Trust & Reputation Authorities Directories Dash Board Audit Aspects Policy Aspects External Log Analysis Service Message Verifier AIPEP PDP Obligations Watchdog Service Provider PEP Audit Guard Dash Actual Application Board Engine Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Agent Services Response Preparer Service Provider 8-May AIPEP PDP

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26 6 april 2009 Eerste planvorming Employability Platform Limburg

27 Limburg Talentrijke Regio Users IInfrastructure Extern -Demand - Employability Platform Limburg Intern -Supply - Consortium stakeholders PPP Regional Financing

28 Opbrengst voor gebruikers Gebruikers: Werknemers/ Werkzoekenden studerenden Werkgevers Eenmalig verstrekken van gegevens Dynamisch en actueel medium Zelf bepalen uitgifte data Makkelijker Opleidings-& loopbaanplanning Direct inzicht in opgebouwd dossier Opleidings- en loopbaanplanning Betere matching mogelijk Ingewikkelde dataopslag mogelijk Assessment mogelijk Onderwijs Overheid Belangenorganisaties Faciliteren werkgevers & werknemers Matching werkzoekenden Doorlopende leerlijnen i.h.k.v. LLL

29 Consortium -voorstel COLO kenniscentra FNV Provincie Limburg Gemeente Maastricht Hogeschool Zuyd (OU, Arcus en Leeuweborgh vanuit LLLL) Ministerie SZW UWV Werkgevers, bijv. Empower Limburg, LWV of MKB

30 Bouw platform EU stelt subsidie beschikbaar voor technische ondersteuning van massale uitrol ESF, EFRO, EBRD (zachte aspecten) 3 regio s nodig, bijv.: Limburg, Manchester en Noord-Ierland Synergetics kan aanvraag voorbereiden. Regionaal commitment nodig + definitie van gebruikersgroepen Synergetics kan uitvoering ter hand nemen. Heeft Europese samenwerking met Cisco Inhoud platform: toelichting Luk Vervenne Vraag: wie wordt aanvrager? Vraag: is er een B. scenario als EU-subsidie niet loskomt? Vraag: voor de zachte kant is verdere financiering nodig. Provincie heeft middelen beschikbaar, wie nog meer?

31 Beheer regionalekennisinfrastructuur (employability platform) Dient structureel ingebed te worden Wordt publiek-private samenwerking Vervult een stafrol met ondersteuning voor gebruikers Hoe is dit duurzaam te financieren en onderhouden? Evt. bijdrage vragen vanuit gebruikers (licentie?) Nieuwste technieken worden telkens geïmplementeerd TTP voor bescherming persoonlijke gegevens Wie is eigenaar?

32 TAS 3 Contact Information Web: luk@synergetics.be 8-May-09 Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services 32